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REVIEW 
 
Mark Olssen, Toward A Global Thin Community: Nietzsche, Foucault, and the Cosmopoli-
tan Commitment (Boulder, Colorado: Paradigm Publishers, 2009), ISBN: 978-1594514470 
 
This book re-examines the liberal-communitarian debate, highlighting the limitations of both 
liberalism and communitarianism, in order to put forth a theory of “‘thin’ communitarianism.” 
(1) According to Olssen, liberalism and neoliberalism have an erroneous human ontology; that 
is, they conceive of humans as ‘pre-social’ beings capable of autonomous moral and practical 
reasoning.  Moreover, Olssen criticizes the liberal idea of self-regulating markets.  At the same 
time, he queries certain aspects of communitarianism, such as the idea of an ‘organic unity’ of 
the community or the communitarian goal to restore moral values.  As he says, “the notion of 
community articulated does not aim to impose any creed or system of values, or to strengthen 
unity or integration beyond what is necessary for survival and continuance of life forms, 
whether conservative, with a big or small ‘c’, or concerned with classical or revised concep-
tions of socialism.” (2) Olssen’s “thin communitarianism” accepts three axioms:  First, it re-
cognizes the social and historical constitution of the self, thereby rejecting the liberal con-
ception of the self as an asocial, isolated, and ahistorical being; second, it abandons the quest 
for “universal naturalistic principles to ground claims,” being “rather a theory which con-
structs universal principles based on pragmatic grounds of avoiding danger and enhancing 
security in the quest for survival and well-being;” third, it rejects the neoliberal idea of self-
regulating markets, suggesting instead that markets require political direction and control. (2-
3)  As Olssen says, thin communitarianism is rooted in recent European theory and is based on 
the ideas of the ‘new liberals’ of the late nineteenth century, such as T.H. Green, J.A. Hobson 
and L.T. Hobhouse. (4ff)  Olssen attempts “to transpose the accomplishments of the social de-
mocratic tradition that influenced the development of the welfare state in the twentieth cen-
tury onto a more realist and pluralist basis” (4); that is to say, instead of looking to repre-
sentatives of philosophical idealism like Hegel, Olssen makes use of the insights of Nietzsche 
and Foucault. (4)  Olssen’s ‘thin’ communitarianism aims to overcome the problems associated 
with Hegel and Marx by safeguarding liberty and difference through the development of “a 
robust conception of democracy.” (5)  In particular, Olssen argues, Nietzsche, Heidegger and 
Foucault hold a complexity theory of reality. (9)  Complexity theories “are systemic, or holist, 
in that they account for diversity, novelty, and unity in the context of a systemic field of com-
plex interactional changes and processes of emergence.  To represent the world as a complex 
order of interactions is to challenge traditional notions of determinism and place the genesis of 
order and design, and responsibility for the future, on human construction.” (67)  “Construc-
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tivist,” for Olssen, “refers to the ontological thesis that the world is meaningless and therefore 
that meaning must be constructed.” (17, note 7) 
Olssen sees Nietzsche as “an affirmative thinker” (21); “he is both a complexity theorist 
and a constructivist.” (22)  Nietzsche placed on man all responsibility for the future; it was up 
to man—individually and collectively—“to survive and live his future, to develop, to grow, 
unconstrained by the past.” (22)  Nietzsche approved of values that are life-enhancing and 
disapproved of values that made life miserable and sickly.  Regarding Foucault, Olssen argues 
that his “ethical and political oeuvre can best be represented as a form of non-monistic com-
munitarianism,” which he calls “‘thin’ communitarianism.” (38)  In ‘thin’ communitarianism 
unity and difference are combined, kept in balance.  Although difference occupies a greater 
place than in enlightenment thinking, it is nonetheless “contextualized in relation to a model 
of community.”  Olssen suggests that the type of political community Foucault intends is “a 
form of democratic associationism.” (38)  So democracy best fits Foucault’s politics of diffe-
rence/community and, Olssen argues, although Foucault did not say so explicitly, he as a Fou-
cauldian does. (60)  Democracy suits Foucault’s purposes not simply because it encourages 
participation by all but, more importantly, because “it permits continued debate, modification, 
rejection, or revision of agreed decisions while enabling a maximum of freedom and auto-
nomy, an ongoing possibility of negotiation and dialogue, and the most effective opposition to 
possible abuses of power.” (60-61) 
Olssen supplements Nietzsche’s and Foucault’s approach with the work of Gilles De-
leuze in order to offer a distinctive, post-structuralist understanding of community.  Thus, 
community is defined “as an all-encompassing arena without fixed borders or unity” and con-
sists of a blend of values, norms and institutions that make life possible. (65; Chapter 4)  Ols-
sen sees in both Nietzsche and Foucault a concern with life. (Chapter 6, 102-127)  For him, “the 
concept of life constitutes a broad scope and a robust conception of the good.”  In referring to 
life as “a substantive conception of the good,” he means that “the quest to sustain life is spe-
cific enough to prohibit certain actions and specify limits to a conception to the reasonable, 
and in this sense to function normatively”; still it is broad enough to allow “many different 
lifestyles and value systems.” (110)  It is Olssen’s argument that, thinking of our future in the 
horizon that presents itself today, what is important is the good of life’s continuance. (114, 125)   
As he says: 
 
Such a conception will have to be democratically mandated, if it is to be acceptable, which 
means that it will have to be acceptable to the vast majority of people, and yet it will have to 
provide a necessary common framework that can both guide and constrain and provide a 
viable basis for a global polity in the age of terrorism, climate change, and much else be-
sides.  (115) 
 
For Olssen, Nietzsche and Foucault are important because they take us beyond the concep-
tion of community as it has been traditionally understood, namely as “a closed and bounded 
totality.”  Despite the significant work of Michael Sandel, Alasdair MacIntyre, Charles Taylor 
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and Michael Walzer,1 their theorization of community is not suitable to the age of globali-
zation. (130)  As Olssen says: 
 
Community… in this view, is a constantly changing set of practices that resists unity and 
closedness.   Although all action springs from a cultural and political context, actions simul-
taneously differentiate, both reproducing and altering existing patterns.  Just as community 
is not confined by space or time, so, too, it does not entail closure or resist change and con-
stitutes an open structure quite consistent with complexity theory postulates of uncertainty, 
non-linearity, unpredictability, and the unexpected assignations associated with unintended 
outcomes of behavior.  (147)2 
 
Olssen puts forth a “continuist ethics” that “incorporates a perspective on life as a will to con-
tinue.” (153)  He believes that a “philosophy of life” informed by Nietzsche and Foucault “can 
support a normative political theory for global governance.” (161)  Criticizing the idea of equi-
librium in economic theory and the neoliberal view of self-regulating markets, Olssen sug-
gests that there must be political co-ordination at the global level in order to control the irre-
gularities of the market. (Chapter 8, 161- 179)  This “normative model of politics is as a com-
plexity management that accepts that all attempts to contain complexity are dangerous (for 
they risk totalitarianism), as well as provisional (for they guarantee no prospects of success).” 
(178)  A “Foucauldian cosmopolitanism,” Olssen argues, concentrates on “a non-economic 
analysis of power” and emphasizes “its equalization or symmetrical distribution.” (201) 
In the final chapter, entitled “Toward a Global Thin Community,” Olssen suggests that 
democracy “must constitute a new universal premised on a will to survive.” (211)  The “prin-
ciple of democracy” he is advocating “is non-foundational but universal,” by which he means 
that it does not presuppose a fixed conception of human nature nor a premise of universal 
(communicative) rationality in the Habermasian sense; rather, it “insists on the protection of 
human rights, recognizes the distinctiveness of sub-cultures, ensures the universal application 
of the rule of law and of open dialogue… based purely on a principle derived from a philo-
sophy of life of a mutual interest in universal survival and well-being.” (212)  In Foucauldian 
fashion, Olssen claims that one essential condition for preventing unity from excluding diver-
sity is the “principle of contestation.” (213-214)  It is this right to contest that makes democracy 
robust.  Our task should be how to deepen democracy and Olssen delineates the major themes 
with which we should be concerned.  These are a new global communitarian ethic, equality 
and redistribution, the regulation of the global economy, the role of the state, the emergence of 
a global public sphere and global governance.  (216-232) 
                                                 
1 See M. J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); A. 
MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 2nd edition (London: Duckworth, 1985); C. Taylor, Philo-
sophy and the Human Sciences, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985) and “Cross-Purposes: 
The Liberal-Communitarian Debate,” in N. Rosenblum (ed.), Liberalism and the Moral Life (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1989); M. Walzer, Spheres of Justice (New York: Basic Books, 1983), “The Com-
munitarian Critique of Liberalism,” Political Theory, Vol. 18 no. 1 (February 1990), 6-23 and Thick and Thin: 
Moral Argument at Home and Abroad (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994).  
2 My italics for emphasis. 
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Mark Olssen’s book is well researched and erudite.  The author draws on a variety of 
philosophical traditions and offers a highly original theory of democracy.  Showing the inade-
quacies of both liberalism and communitarianism, but also extracting what is valuable from 
each of these two positions, Olssen articulates a middle position, which, he argues, can meet 
the challenges of our globalized world (climate change, terrorism, over-population, the deple-
tion of natural resources, poverty, economic instabilities and growing inequalities).  Olssen 
deals with theoretical or philosophical issues and problems of contemporary politics equally 
well.  Not only does he show the relevance of Nietzsche and Foucault today, but he also de-
monstrates the importance of political theory and philosophy for grappling with the com-
plexities of the global politics of our time.  Overall, this is an important, challenging and re-
warding book. 
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